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Workshop Minutes (January 25, 2001) 
Prospects for Succession and the Orderly Evolution of Political Power in Cuba 
 
 
Fulton Armstrong opened the workshop by describing the assumptions the participants 
would make in analyzing the prospects for political succession in Cuba.  First, they could 
assume that Fidel Castro wants a “legacy” whereby his own followers would be in charge 
after he abdicates.  Second, Castro’s people want to stay in power afterwards and 
therefore need a “Plan” that is not widely known.  Third, Castro is involved in this 
planning, but is not likely to hand over power in advance, as he would like to control the 
change.  Fourth and last, as no one can fill Castro’s role precisely, how much change is 
likely and how fast will it come? 
The key variables that the participants were asked to consider were level of violence 
(if any) upon regime change, military/state security support of transition, the credibility 
of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP) during transition, existence of an united opposition 
(i.e. with or without popular support), and the likely international reaction to these events. 
 
Jorge Dominguez stated that several important indicators appear to point toward further 
regime stability rather than succession.  However, he contended that a significant 
transition was underway from a totalitarian to an authoritarian regime.  Dominguez was 
skeptical of a peaceful succession upon Fidel Castro’s death, but believed that such a 
possibility might occur.  To bolster his argument that Cuban politics are in transition 
rather than moving through a succession process, Dominguez asserted that today’s 
situation in Cuba is similar to the 1970s.  He argued that, in both cases, changes were 
evidence of regime stability rather than indications of a succession movement or process.  
Dominguez described the transition as a three-fold process: 
• Economic -- markets are a part of Cuba’s present and future. 
• Military -- the Cuban military is being downsized. 
• Ideological -- the revolutionary focus has been replaced by emphasis on economic 
progress. 
To institutionalize these changes, Dominguez argued that wide delegation of 
authority to technocrats and regional Cuban Communist Party (CCP) First Secretaries is 
occurring.  These members of the elite have increased power and occasionally break the 
rules without penalty.  However, he believed these actions reflected the fact that Cuban 
Communist Party members were merely diversifying their portfolios to have a stronger 
power base when succession occurred; they were not intent on hastening succession.   
Dominguez noted that Fidel Castro and his top leadership remained in control. The 
First Secretary of the Communist Party retained authority to overrule Senate laws and 
state-controlled economic austerity measures continued to be the order of the day.  Raul 
Castro remained the most likely figure to succeed to the top leadership position upon 
Fidel’s death.  
 
Randy Pherson observed that there are many potential indicators of change in Cuba, but 
the challenge is to look at the right ones (those pertaining to succession).  He believed 
that the “positioning” of military leaders, mid-level bureaucrats, and others in preparation 
for transition is crucial in determining who is shoring up future political power.  For 
 
2 
Pherson, rules may not matter at all, nor the current national political system, as there 
may be other leaders outside of Havana waiting to assume control. 
 
Marifeli Perez-Stable noted the development of both a mobilizational and institutional 
model within Cuba during the 1990s.  Mobilizational politics stress “values” such as 
Fidel Castro’s leadership, Cuba’s historic mission, honor, revolutionary ethics, and the 
need for sacrifice.  Institutional politics emphasize collective leadership, strengthening 
institutions, less centralized economic control, and more attention to the needs of 
everyday life rather than the imperatives of history.  Perez-Stable asserted that, by 1997, 
these two models combined to form the “Third Way,”  which is characterized by 
economic reform, legalization of private enterprise, and an opening of the political 
system amidst the presence of mass mobilizations.  She asserted that the Third Way has 
arisen because, during the 1990s, a significant number of people in leadership positions 
wanted reform, but the reformers lacked resources and were stopped by Castro and the 
conservatives. 
Perez-Stable noted that the CCP has been reinvigorated during the 1990s.  In 
particular, regional party cadre membership has increased over this time, with cadre 
representation as a percentage of the Central Committee now standing around 40%, a 
significant increase from the late 1980s.  Since 1999, provincial parties have seen two 
rounds of Party Assemblies.  The CCP is developing new methods and styles to make 
socialism more effective while emphasizing CCP leadership and credibility.  Since 2000, 
more attention has been paid to mass organizations, e.g., roundtables, demonstrations, 
and public assemblies have been emphasized.  However, Perez-Stable noted that, 
although the people continue to respond to these mobilizations, they are merely going 
through the motions.  Socialist and revolutionary rhetoric no longer inspires them. 
The military is also a changed institution from that of the early 1990s.  It still prepares 
to resist possible aggression, but now has an expanded role in civic affairs, especially 
through manufacturing and construction.  The military and state security organizations 
have also become the guardians of  market economics, a role that Perez-Stable contended 
gives officers the opportunity to develop “golden parachutes” that strengthen their 
attachment to the communist regime.  
Perez-Stable concluded that the Third Way will take Cuba through Castro’s passing, 
unless the people tire of mobilizational politics and stop even going through the motions.  
In either event, she asserted that the Third Way is not preparing the Cuban leadership for 
the post-Castro era.  Although Cuba and its leadership are in a better position than during 
the 1990s, Cuban elites are resistant to change.  However, she believed that the CCP 
would remain a part of any successor regime. 
 
Mark Falcoff observed that the CCP’s survival throughout the economically austere 
decade of the 1990s must have convinced many mid-career professionals and bureaucrats 
that the Third Way would permit peaceful political succession under CCP rule.  He 
acknowledged Cuba’s economic problems-- particularly the near exhaustion of its capital 
stock -- but considered that the infusion of youthful members into the CCP might work 
against “mobilization exhaustion.”  Furthermore, even if mobilization resources became 
exhausted, he wondered if fear of the “Miami alternative” might keep emigration under 
control.  He also felt that current elites might remain in power even if they proved 
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resistant to change because Cuba lacked alternatives to their continued rule.   
 
Damian Fernandez presented his “Dynamic Model” of contemporary Cuba.  He 
believes that the Cuban political leadership has sustained its power against a backdrop 
characterized by three phenomena: 
• Destatization – The state’s hold over the every day life of its people has eased, 
principally through the rise of  market economics, increased influence of the Catholic 
Church, and a general decay of enthusiasm for socialism. 
• Informalization – Social relationships are becoming increasingly important compared 
to the people’s relationship with the state. 
• Individualization – New social classes are emerging and becoming important in social 
and political relations.  In this regard, Fernandez emphasized the potential importance 
of the rise of “civic activists,” government officials who use their positions to 
improve social welfare, but often stretch the rules in the process.  He noted that 
scholars have not adequately studied this potentially important emerging group. 
Fernandez contended that the state is slowly losing importance at the level of 
everyday life, although it is still perceived to be a strong source of upward mobility, 
particularly for the young.  He further maintained that Cuba has entered a period of 
downward adjustment, as State control is reduced through the three processes described 
in his model.  He described this changing relationship between the government and the 
people as a tacit modus vivendi: formal control by the state that allows a certain degree of 
informal resistance by the people( but no overt, organized opposition).  This has 
manifested itself in the presence of a doble moral or dual morality among the people, 
who apply different standards of conduct when dealing with public and private matters.  
Fernandez concluded that the possibility of a softer succession is more likely now, given 
this arrangement. 
 
Dan Fisk agreed that the Cuban government is downsizing and is aware of its relative 
decline.  He therefore recommended looking at certain benchmarks within Cuban popular 
culture as indicators of how far change has progressed.  These included developments in 
artisan theatres (engaging the state), among intellectuals (in their relationship with the 
state as alternative analysts), the state school system (as an indicator of Party discipline), 
the Armed forces and their role in the economy, dissident presence (and individual acts of 
protest), and the formation of a new dissident leadership.  Given Fernandez’ comments 
and Perez-Stable’s remarks about how the Cuban people were just going through the 
motions of mobilizational politics, Fisk wondered if an examination of these factors 
might show that popular culture has already experienced a succession to a post-
revolutionary/post-communist stage of political life. 
 
Edward Gonzalez characterized external factors affecting succession by presenting two 
possible scenarios. 
First, Gonzalez viewed Cuba “through a  glass darkly.”  He asserted that Cuba’s older 
generation (over 40 years of age) fears the consequences of change after Castro. This 
group wants their entitlement programs maintained, which may not occur if the economy 
continues to become more open to outside markets.  This group views with concern 
changes that have occurred in Russia, the Baltic states, and other Eastern European states 
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following the fall of communism.  The senior/mid-level ranks of the elite (the 
revolutionaries of the 1950-60s) share these concerns, but have more to lose if the Cuban 
Communist Party loses power. 
Gonzalez next viewed Cuba “through a glass brightly.”  Several groups view 
succession as a clearly desirable development.  These include Cuba’s youth, the group 
that has had the most contact with the outside world.  They view the present order as an 
obstacle, and embrace rapid change as necessary for themselves and Cuba.  Members of 
this group may emigrate from Cuba if things do not develop along their preferred path. 
The Cuban intelligentsia and professional class have the most exposure to the West, and 
want normalized relations with the world.  However, they may not necessarily be pro-
West and in favor of open markets. Others who may work towards liberalizing Cuba 
include self-employed entrepreneurs who want more market access, and junior party 
leaders who do not have so much invested in the CCP. 
Gonzalez contended that Afro-Cubans comprise 50 percent of the population and are 
ambivalent regarding succession.  On the one hand, they feel they will become more 
important politically following succession, because they do not share many of the 
benefits of the current order and have suffered various forms of discrimination under its 
rule.  On the other hand, they are aware of the uncertainties accompanying succession, 
and understand that succession might actually worsen their condition.  
 
Julia Sweig remarked that there is an evolving coalition of domestic groups and a 
relationship between domestic reform and external factors within Cuba.  External factors 
include: Cuban trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), migration, travel, foreign contacts, 
and diplomatic relations.  In the last 10 years, domestic reform includes: increased 
religious freedom, dollarization of portions of the economy, dismantling of state farms, 
and civic activism at the local level.  She contended that all of these developments have 
been driven by the regime’s need to respond to economic contraction following the 
discontinuation of Soviet subsidies.  She does not believe that any reforms undertaken 
thus far are attributable to US policy towards Cuba.  On the contrary, she asserted that 
Cubans have shown a uniformly negative response to US policies and actions toward 
Cuba.  
 
A discussion period followed, in which participants were asked whether the forgoing 
presentations lent credence to the existence of a Cuban government plan to mange 
succession.  Fernandez stated that the Catholic Church has become a popular cultural 
force, but does not represent an explicit political strategy to shape succession.  Jerry 
Gallucci asked what would have happened if Castro had died earlier, before the transition 
period began?  Who would have started the succession? Are there institutional 
mechanisms running that are independent of Castro’s death?  Domiguez responded that 
there is no strategy in place, but there is a tool kit, with missing tools.  There is a problem 
with the rules, which are still designed to concentrate power in Fidel Castro’s hands.  The 
tools have been updated in the 1990s, but are not effective for transition. 
Kenneth Flamm from the University of Texas remarked that a distinction should 
be drawn between a transition required by the withdrawal of Soviet support and true 
succession dynamics.  There is nothing in place today like Deng Xiaoping’s plan for 
succession.  There has been an effort to put new people in authority at lower levels, 
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which are not responsible to the Old Guard.  There has also been an effort to anoint a 
young protégé for Castro, but without success thus far.  Additionally, there is also a 
conscious effort to balance authority between economic technocrats and ideologues.  
Dominguez added that the personnel changes in the 1990s are not part of a succession 
plan, but are used as a de facto plan currently.  He observed that the fact that many high-
level ruling elite have only been in place since the 1990s means that the CCP has a group 
of individuals who are accustomed to ruling without Soviet subsidies.  Such a group 
could facilitate Raul Castro’s succession upon Fidel’s death. 
_____ 
 
Bill LeoGrande kicked off the afternoon session, which dealt with mechanisms  of 
succession, by presenting two scenarios: sudden succession (Fidel Castro dies within the 
next two years), or later succession (Castro dies in ten to fifteen years).  In the first case, 
the Cuban elite will be very confused and distracted, which will disrupt their cohesion 
and degrade their ability to resolve conflict among themselves.  Raul Castro can be 
expected to become the new leader and the elite would rally in his support.  There would 
be no significant policy change, but a greater internal debate about long-run change. 
Under the later succession scenario, the members of a successor regime would have 
controlled an increasingly large part of Cuban political life as the aging Fidel Castro 
reduced the areas over which he exercised direct control.  As a result, internal conflicts 
within the elite would be less intense than in the first scenario because some of the larger 
issues would have already been resolved.  The future direction of the economy would be 
more settled and golden parachutes would be more widely dispersed.  Members of the 
younger generation will have filled elite positions as older members have retired or died, 
which should improve the elite’s flexibility in responding effectively to increased popular 
demands for change.  In all, a system will develop which is more receptive to political 
reform, as the post-Castro elite identifies with nationalist views that push for increased 
economic liberalization while attempting to remain independent from the United States. 
 
Kenneth Flamm used structural changes in Cuba during the 1990s to argue that Cuban 
economic policy can only develop in one direction, i.e., toward increased liberalization 
and marketization, if the ruling elite were to continue to provide satisfactory economic 
conditions for their people.  He noted that, following the withdrawal of Soviet subsidies, 
the Cuban regime had only two options to prevent popular discontent due to economic 
hardship: 
• It must find a new sponsor to replace the Soviet Union or 
• It must adopt an outward looking development strategy. 
Flamm asserted that there were no other prospective patrons except for the United 
States, which was clearly unacceptable.  Accordingly, the regime had to embrace some 
degree of economic liberalization.  FDI was liberalized, as was tourism, a variable 
exchange rate was implemented, the agricultural system was quasi-privatized, and small-
scale private enterprises were tolerated/legalized.  While the state economy and sugar 
production declined, tourism, non-state employment, resource-based exports (nickel, 
cobalt), biotechnologies, and Internet activities increased. 
Flamm reasoned that, since the key elements of Cuban economic liberalization 
involve tourism, resource-based exports, and high technology/services niches -- with the 
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key market being the United States, --  increasing Cuban integration with the rest of the 
world is inevitable.  In fact, he noted that tourism is already vital to the economy, and it is 
becoming harder to control foreign contacts as many Cubans are already connected with 
the outside world. 
Flamm maintained that the result so far has been the development of a dual economy, 
an outward looking one characterized by dollarization , trade, and tourism, and the other 
domestically-based.  Flamm noted that the dual economy has been an increasing source 
of domestic tension.  
 
Mark Falcoff remarked that Cuba is part of the Latin American “familia of revolucions” 
(e.g. Nicaragua, Bolivia, Mexico), but with Eastern European touches.  He argued 
therefore that one should expect the CCP to assimilate forty years of revolutionary 
experience as it continues public socialism and teaches revolution in its schools.  For 
example, the Dominican Republic had a dictatorship, an island society, state 
employment, a strong state security structure, and was meddling with its neighbors 
(including the US). It had a succession under the existing political elite.  There are 
similarities that could apply to Cuba. 
 
The remainder of the workshop was comprised of a discussion about the internal and 
external implications of succession in Cuba: 
Jerry Gallucci believed that Castro is trying to stir up revolutionary elites, keep them 
on their toes, and make small changes so that after his death his regime will survive.  
Andy Claster thought that a post-Castro regime possessed a number of levers to win 
popular support, such as privatizing sectors of the economy.  Dominguez noted that Raul 
Castro still has weak political skills, and needs some breathing room to develop military, 
political, and economic policy if he is to successfully assume the leadership role after 
Fidel’s death.  However, Howard Davis believed that Raul Castro is a good transition 
figure.  He has credibility in the military, with the elite, and with old revolutionaries. He 
must use existing institutions to accommodate/channel protests and change. 
Amy Rollins noted the importance of monitoring the pace of change as well as the 
kinds of changes that are occurring.  Sweig and Flamm mentioned the effect of sanctions 
on regime transition in Cuba.  Sweig believed that sanctions are allowing Castro to 
control the pace of change in Cuba. 
Perez-Stable commented that Cuba is looking for ways to normalize relations with the 
US without repeating the past.  She noted that Cuban women have a different set of 
issues to address.  Jeff DeLaurentis added that Cuba would gauge normalization in 
relation to its national economic goals.  
With regard to external factors, Falcoff believed that the successor regime’s foreign 
policy would include accepting aid from Europe and the US Cuban-American 
community.  But such a move would require a change in rhetoric, further political 
liberalization (release of political prisoners), and freedom of the media (gradually).  All 
are examples of reform.  Flamm contended that drugs and migration would be problems 
after transition, as there are no controls on these phenomena within Cuba.   
Kathy Degutis concluded that the first six months or year of the new government 
would be critical to understanding the regime. 
